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The Science of DNA Identification: From the
Laboratory to the Courtroom (and Beyond)
David H. Kaye*
For much of the Twentieth Century, the scientific icon was
the atom. This was the "atomic age"-a period of atomic
bombs, atomic submarines, atomic clocks, and nuclear
medicine. As the Twenty-first Century unrolls, the dominant
scientific icon is no longer the atom; it is the double helix, the
backbone of the DNA molecule. 1
The sequences of the
"nucleotide base pairs" that link the two strands of the double
helix are seen by some bioethicists as the "secret future diaries"
of human beings 2 and by some scientists as "in essence....
3
what makes humans human."
This imagery and essentialism is exaggerated, 4 but that is
a topic for another occasion.
This article will focus on
sequences of DNA base-pairs that are of little or no importance
in medicine but that have become exceedingly important in
law. I refer to the genetic features used by forensic scientists to

© 2007 David H. Kaye.
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Technology.
This article was derived from a Deinard Memorial Lecture on Law and
Medicine, at the University of Minnesota Law School, on January 31, 2006.
1. See DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON (1995); Dorothy Nelkin, Molecular Metaphors: The
Gene in PopularDiscourse, 2 NATURE REV. GENETICS 555 (2001).

2.

George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded

'FutureDiaries,' 270 JAMA 2346 (1993).

3.

Julie Meyne, The Human Genome Project: Impact on the Prevalence of

Diabetes, Aug. 1997, http://darwin.nmsu.edu/-molbio/diabetes/human.html.
Cf.Nicholas Wade, Life Is Pared to Basics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at F3
(reporting the concern expressed by a medical ethicist that "when biologists
sequenced the first human chromosome last month, they called it 'the first
chapter in the book of life, as if life is chromosomes').
4. See, e.g., RICHARD LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX: GENE, ORGANISM,
AND ENVIRONMENT (2000); Eric T. Juengst, FACE Facts: Why Human Genetics
Will Always Provoke Bioethics, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267 (2004).
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characterize biological trace evidence that contains DNAprimarily blood stains, semen, saliva, and hair. The variations
in DNA sequences, which are found at particular locations, or
"loci," in the genome, are known as "alleles." Matching DNA
alleles can be used to ascertain the likely source of a crimescene sample and to establish family relationships. Testimony
as to these DNA loci has appeared in cases of child support,
domestic relations, immigration and naturalization, slander,
and even judicial discipline. But it is the criminal justice
system that has benefited the most from forensic DNA
identification, both in terms of exonerating the innocent and
convicting the guilty.
This article will survey the history, nature, and uses of the
science of human DNA identification as it has moved from the
laboratory to the courtroom. Part I describes the process by
which courts admit (or exclude) scientific evidence and how
scientists have responded to the legal milieu. The tale is one of
legal doctrine, of lawyers and their limitations, of courts and
confusion, of journalists and misreporting, and of adversarial
science and egos. 5 Part II moves from these doctrinal and
historical developments in the law of evidence to several of the
ethical, social, and constitutional questions created by current
developments in forensic DNA analysis, and by the creation
and expansion of forensic DNA repositories and databases.
I. THE LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF DNA IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE
Only a few concepts from the law of evidence are needed to
describe the judicial response to efforts to introduce DNA
evidence. All expert witnesses-scientific and otherwise-are
expected to have specialized knowledge that can assist the jury

5. The historical survey pretermits the use of DNA typing in postconviction relief. These cases have played an extremely important role in
criminal justice, but they are less directly connected to admissibility issues.
For discussions of DNA exonerations, see EDWARD CONNORS ET AL.,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE
OF DNA EVIDENCE To ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996); BARRY
SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Paul C. Giannelli,

Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on Forensic Science, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 627 (2001); Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double

Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
547 (2002).
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in understanding the facts.
In almost all jurisdictions,
however, scientific experts must clear an additional hurdle.
This special scrutiny of scientific methodology varies among
jurisdictions, but two major standards have emerged, the
general-acceptance standard and the Daubert standard. The
general-acceptance standard, introduced in a 1923 case entitled
Frye v. United States, requires proof that most knowledgeable
6
scientists accept a theory or technique as valid and reliable.
The Daubert standard, adopted in 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,does not treat general acceptance among
scientists as definitive but considers it to be one factor that
helps demonstrate the underlying validity of the theory. 7 The
two standards are quite flexible and depend entirely on the
rigor with which the court chooses to apply them.8
Starting in the late 1980s, courts across the country began
to apply these standards to DNA evidence. 9 The ensuing legal
history can be divided into at least four phases: (1) a period of
uncritical acceptance of Variable Number Tandem Repeat
(VNTR) typing; (2) serious challenges to analytical methods
and the statistical interpretation of the results; (3) renewed
acceptance of DNA evidence; and (4) acceptance of more
advanced systems of DNA analysis.
A. PHASE I: UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF

VNTRs

The first genetic loci used in forensic testing were
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms (RFLPs). These
are variations in the length of the DNA sequence between two
sites at which bacterial enzymes cut the long DNA molecule

into pieces. For example, the population might include some
people with 3,200 base pairs between the two restriction sites,
some with 1,200 base pairs, and some with both (one on each
chromosome).
Human geneticists had been using RFLP
technology for years as markers for mutations that produced
genetic diseases. These markers, however, were usually simple
systems with a few easily distinguishable alleles, such as the
two postulated above.
6. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. See D.H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EXPERT EVIDENCE (2004).

9. By the end of the 1980s, a substantial minority of federal circuits and
states had rejected the general-acceptance standard of Frye in favor of a
"reliability-plus" standard comparable to Daubert. See id.
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The type of loci that proved powerful enough for human
identification was discovered serendipitously in 1984 by
geneticist, Sir Alec Jeffries, at the University of Leicester. 10
These VNTR loci involve many possible alleles that are almost
continuous in their lengths. A short sequence of base pairs is
repeated, back to back, various numbers of times. Instead of
only two possible alleles (such as the 1,200 and 3,200 base-pair
alleles), there can be many alleles of different lengths. The
lengths have no medical significance, but they do give rise to
measurable differences that enable analysts to distinguish
among different individuals. Figure 1 is an "autoradiograph"
showing the alleles of one VNTR locus in eleven different
people. The DNA fragments, which carry a negative charge,
have been pulled through a slab of gelatinous material by an
electric field so that they have moved distances proportional to
their lengths. The dark spots mark the final positions of the
fragments. Shorter fragments have moved farther down the
gel. Each person has either one or two alleles (discernibly
different fragment lengths) that appear in each vertical lane.
FIGURE 1.

AUTORADIOGRAPH OF

ELEVEN INDIVIDUALS

VNTR ALLELES AT A SINGLE Locus

IN

11

In the earliest DNA cases, the technology was the subject
of lopsided testimony. In some instances, defendants objected
10. See Alec J. Jeffreys, Highly Variable Minisatellites and DNA
Fingerprints,15 BIOCHEMICAL SOCY TRANS. 309 (1987); Alec J. Jeffreys et al.,
DNA "Fingerprints"and SegregationAnalysis of Multiple Markers in Human
Pedigrees, 39 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 11 (1986); A.J. Jeffreys et al., IndividualSpecific 'Fingerprints'of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985); Alec J. Jeffreys
et al., Hypervariable 'Minisatellite"Regions in Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67
(1985).
11. The autoradiograph was produced by the FBI in 1988.
It is
reproduced from OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS:
FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 47 (1990).
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that the technology as adapted to forensic usage was not
generally accepted or adequately validated, but they produced
no experts to question the claim of general acceptance. In one
Texas case, Kelly v. State, 12 the defense produced an expert
who, as the court delicately put it, "was certified to teach life
and earth sciences in public schools" and who testified that
radioactivity, which had been introduced into medicine in the
late 1930s, 13 was too new to be generally accepted.14
Not
surprisingly, this idiosyncratic view did not prevail over the
unequivocal assurances of general acceptance from three
university or medical school professors who testified for the
prosecution.
The courts in these lopsided cases had little difficulty
finding general acceptance or scientific validity. 15 Such cases
can have a snowball or avalanche effect. Other courts cite
them as having found general acceptance or scientific validity.
The snowball grows until it becomes an avalanche, increasingly
difficult to stop even if there are serious grounds to question
the scientific technique. This is currently the situation with
dermatoglyphic fingerprinting.
Fingerprints obviously are
highly variable, but the validity and reliability of analysts
working with latent prints of varying quality have not been
rigorously studied.
Yet, because the technique is so well
ensconced, courts have been reluctant to apply faithfully the
16
Daubert standard of scientific validity.
B. PHASE II: CHALLENGES TO ANALYTICAL METHODS,
STATISTICS, AND POPULATION GENETICS MODELS

Despite the initial momentum of DNA evidence, defense
counsel were able to raise important questions. The details of
the laboratory procedures were questioned, and limitations
were identified in the statistical and population-genetics
models used in estimating the frequencies of the DNA types.
One case that undermined judicial confidence is People v.

12.

792 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).

13. See, e.g., Joao Jos6 Pedroso de Lima, Radioisotopes in Medicine, 19
EUROPEAN J. PHYSICS 485, 485 (1998).
14. Radioactive isotopes are used in producing the bands in the

autoradiograph.
15. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205(B) (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th
ed. 2006).
16. See, e.g., id. § 207(A).
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Castro.17 In this case, the defense found strong grounds to
question the interpretation of the DNA tests conducted by
Lifecodes, a commercial laboratory specializing in forensic DNA
testing.
The defense witnesses included Eric Lander, a
mathematician-turned-biologist at MIT who was to become a
leader in the Human Genome Project. Richard Roberts, who
was to receive the Noble prize a few years later, testified for the
state at a twelve-week hearing that resulted in a transcript of
some 5,000 written pages. Judge Gerald Sheindlin, who went
on to write two books on DNA evidence,1 8 excluded the
testimony of a DNA match, referring to the defense's "piercing
attack on each molecule of evidence." 19
When scientists of this caliber differ, courts normally are
at a loss to decide who is right. Here, the court had no
difficulty. After reviewing Lander's concerns, Roberts proposed
that the scientists for both parties meet without the lawyers.
This unchaperoned tte-&-tte resulted in a joint statement
concluding that "the DNA data in this case are not scientifically
reliable enough to support the assertion that the samples do or
do not match."20 The scientists subscribing to the statement
agreed that Lifecodes had failed to perform experiments that
might have explained certain anomalous bands and that the
reported probability of a random match "understates the actual
21
probability."
Despite the defects in the laboratory work in Castro and a
few other cases, most courts continued to find forensic RFLP-

17. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. 1989). Indeed, Castro was said to be "the first
serious challenge to DNA 'fingerprinting."' Robert D. Mcfadden, Reliability of
DNA Testing Challenged by Judge's Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1989, at B1.
According to Clay Strange,
what had been widely accepted in the press and hailed as a major
advance was now viewed skeptically, even as unreliable by one New
York Times reporter. The fact that Castro was based "on technical
aspects of a particular case and not the fundamental scientific
validity of DNA technology" was obscured.
Clay Strange, Book Review, DNA's Search for Truth, 83 JUDICATURE 165, 166
(1999).
18. BLOOD TRAIL: TRUE CRIME MYSTERIES SOLVED BY DNA DETECTIVES
(1996); GENETIC FINGERPRINTING: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF DNA EVIDENCE

(1996).
19. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
20. Roger Parloff, How Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld Tripped Up the
DNA Experts, Am. LAWYER., Dec. 1989, at 1.
21. Id.
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VNTR analyses to be generally accepted, and a number of
22
states provided for admissibility of DNA tests by legislation.
A more sweeping attack on DNA profiling that began in
Castro led to a wave of cases in which many courts held that
estimates of the probability of a coincidentally matching VNTR
profile were inadmissible.
These estimates relied on a
simplified population-genetics model for the frequencies of
VNTR profiles that treats each race as a large, randomly
mating population. Some prominent scientists claimed that the
applicability of the model had not been adequately verified and
that it was inaccurate because ethnic or religious subgroups
tend to mate preferentially among themselves. 23 A heated
debate on the significance of this population substructure
spilled over from courthouses to scientific journals and
convinced the supreme courts of several states that general
acceptance was lacking. 24 A 1992 report of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS), as a compromise, proposed a more
"conservative" computational method, dubbed "the ceiling
principle" by its inventor and National Research Council
committee member, Eric Lander.25 The apparent need for a
compromise seemed to undermine the claim of scientific
acceptance of the less conservative procedure that was in
general use. Other NAS recommendations (for improvements
in quality control and assurance and more objective standards
for declaring matches) also were seen by some observers as
demanding the exclusion of DNA evidence. An article by New
York Times biomedical reporter Gina Kolata propounded a
22. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25. This statute provides that
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis ...
are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that
DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method of
identifying characteristics in an individual's genetic material upon a
showing that the offered testimony meets the standards for
admissibility set forth in the Rules of Evidence.
Presumably, it is intended to relieve the state of the burden of showing that a
particular DNA typing method satisfies Frye (the standard used in
Minnesota), but, by and large, the Minnesota courts have studiously ignored
it. See, e.g., State v. Kromah, 657 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 2003).

23. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts over DNA Fingerprinting: A
Bitter Debate Is Raging over How the Results of this New Forensic Technique
Are Interpretedin Court, 254 SCIENCE 1721 (1991)
24. See David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability,Population Genetics,
and the Courts, 7 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 101 (1993).
25. COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC Sm., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE (1992).
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particularly tendentious view of the report.2 6 After a special
press conference called by Victor McCusick, the chairman of the
committee, the New York Times (grudgingly if you read the fine
2 7
print) confessed error.
C. PHASE III: RENEWED ACCEPTANCE
At this juncture the legal history entered a third phase.
The 1992 NAS report's advocacy of the "ceiling principle" for
computing random-match probabilities without assuming
random mating within broadly defined races came in for
withering criticism. Many population geneticists regarded this
procedure as ad hoc and excessively conservative. 28 Before
long, the procedure was denigrated as being neither a "ceiling"
nor a "principle." 29 In 1996, a second NAS panel concluded that
data collected on subpopulations from across the world
confirmed that the usual method of estimating frequencies of
30
VNTR profiles in broad racial groups generally was sound.
Moreover, in the period between the two reports, an FBI
geneticist and Eric Lander joined forces to write commentary in
Nature with the reassuring title "DNA Fingerprinting Dispute
Laid to Rest."31
The article pointed to improvements in
laboratory
standards
and
additional
research
into
subpopulations.
Impressed with Lander's sudden, public
conversion to the view that the population-genetics issues were
no longer serious obstacles to admissibility, and reassured by
the 1996 NAS report, courts began to regard concerns over
population substructure as passe. In this manner, the courts
almost invariably returned to the earlier view that the
statistics associated with VNTR profiling are generally

26. Gina Kolata, U.S. Panel Seeking Restrictions On Use of DNA in
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at Al. The article began by claiming that
the committee had said that DNA typing "should not be allowed in court in the
future unless a more scientific basis is established." It insisted that "[t]he new
report ... says courts should cease to admit DNA evidence...." Id.
27. Gina Kolata, Chief Says Panel Backs Courts' Use of a Genetic Test,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A23.
28. See Peter Aldhous, Geneticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically
Flawed, 259 SCIENCE 755 (1993).
29. Kaye, supra note 24.
30. COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996).

31. Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA FingerprintingDispute Laid to
Rest, 371 NATURE 735 (1994).
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accepted and scientifically valid both in major population
32
groups and in subgroups.
D. PHASE IV: ACCEPTANCE OF PCR-BASED METHODS

In the final phase of the judicial acceptance of DNA
evidence, prosecutors moved away from VNTR loci and
introduced matches based on other DNA features. Analysis of
these sites of DNA variation was made possible by the use of
the polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
Discovered by the
colorful Kary Mullis, 3 3 PCR is a chemical process that makes
copies of small DNA fragments, then copies of copies, then
copies of all those copies, and so on. 34
Contrary to the
nomenclature of many judicial opinions, PCR is not a forensic
typing method. It is simply a preliminary step. Once the
particular loci of interest have been "amplified," perhaps a
million-fold, with PCR, they can be analyzed in various ways.
The most common procedure examines Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) loci, which have a core element of a handful of base pairs
repeated a relatively small number of times. Per locus, they
are less variable than VNTRs, but much easier to measure and
3 5
interpret.
As results obtained with the PCR-based methods entered

32. Two cases illustrate these developments. In People v. Miller, 670
N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1996), the Supreme Court of Illinois observed that "while there
has been some controversy over the use of the product rule in calculating the
frequency of a DNA match, that controversy appears to be dissipating." Id. at
731-32. The court cited the Lander-Budowle paper as proof that "[t]he
concerns ... appear not to have been borne out by empirical studies." Id. at
732. The next year, in People v. Hickey, 687 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. 1997), the same
court determined that a Frye hearing no longer was required in light of Miller
and the fact that
[t]he 1996 report concludes that "[t]he state of the profiling
technology and the methods for estimating frequencies and related
statistics have progressed to the point where the admissibility of
properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt"
and that the report "also specifically concludes that sufficient data
have been gathered to establish that the interim ceiling principle is
not needed and further recommends that, in general, the calculation
of a profile frequency should be made with the product rule."
Id. at 291.
33. See KARY MULLIS, DANCING NAKED IN THE MIND FIELD (1998); Emily
Yoffe, Is Kary Mullis God?, ESQUIRE, July 1, 1994, at 68.
34. See, e.g., PCR TECHNOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS FOR DNA
AMPLIFICATION (H.A. Erlich ed., 1989).
35. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS (2d ed. 2005).
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the courtroom, it became necessary to ask whether these
methods also rested on a solid scientific foundation or were
generally accepted in the scientific community. The opinions
were practically unanimous in holding that the current
laboratory procedures for STR typing (as well as earlier
systems) satisfy these standards. 36 They also held that the socalled "product rule" for estimating the frequencies of DNA
types in major population groups is scientifically sound and
37
generally accepted for the loci investigated in these tests.
In sum, in little more than a decade, DNA typing made the
transition from a novel set of methods for identification to a
relatively mature and well studied forensic technology.
Although some of the defense objections in this period seem
misconceived or overblown, the adversary system is structured
to exaggerate or amplify differences in the scientific
community. Moreover, whatever hyperbole there was-and
there was hyperbole on both sides-the defense criticisms
contributed to improvements in protocols, more extensive
proficiency testing, and research in population genetics and
statistics.
II. EMERGING ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Although the most significant issues related to the
admissibility of forensic DNA testing have been resolved,
several aspects of the investigative phase of DNA work remain
highly contentious. These include inferring race or ethnicity
from crime-scene samples, acquiring DNA samples without
consent or judicial warrants, and amassing and using DNA
databases for law-enforcement purposes.
A. INFERRING RACE OR ETHNICITY FROM CRIME-SCENE SAMPLES
A former official at the National Human Genome Research
Institute stated: "Of high concern to us is the use of DNA as a
high-tech form of racial profiling, [to determine the]
probabilities ... of an individual being from this race or that
ethnic group."38 But why should this practice be considered

36. 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 32:3 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2006).

37. See cases cited in id.
38. Kathy Hudson, Keynote Address at the American University Law
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"racial profiling"? In some cases, the crime-scene sample will
point to African-Americans; in others, it will point to Whites.
There is no pre-established racial profile. For Equal Protection
purposes, it is comparable to relying on an eyewitness's
description of the culprit as Asian, or Hispanic, or Black, or
White to focus an investigation. 39 Admittedly, the categories
are socially constructed and imperfectly correlated with genetic
markers, but anthropologists have produced ancestryinformative markers (AIMs),40 and they may be roughly
indicative of physical features. 41 If genetic analysis of ancestry
is reasonably accurate, one could argue that it is protective of
the rights of minorities, as it reduces the risk of initial
stereotyping and focuses the investigation on the group where
it belongs.
B. ACQUISITION OF SUSPECTS' DNA

Many more civil-liberties issues arise when police seek to
acquire DNA samples from suspects for comparison to samples
from crime scenes. 42 The government must conform to the
Fourth Amendment, which refers to "[t]he right of the people to
be secure.., against unreasonable searches and seizures" and
specifies that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause ... ."43 However, precisely when a judicial warrant and

Review Symposium: The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law:
The American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science
(Oct. 19, 2001), in 51 Am. U. L. REV. 431, 442 (2002).
39. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or
Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 447-51 (2001).
40. E.g., Heather E. Collins-Schramm et al., Mexican American AncestryInformative Markers: Examination of Population Structure and Marker
Characteristicsin European Americans, Mexican Americans, Amerindians and
Asian, 114 HUM. GENETICS 263 (2004); Mary-Anne Enoch et al., Using
Ancestry-Informative Markers to Define Populations and Detect Population
Stratification,20 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 19 (2006).
41. The commercial firm, DNAPrint, offers the following service to police
agencies: "DNAWitnessTM will provide the percentage of genetic make up
amongst the four possible groups of Sub-Saharan African, Native American,
East
Asian,
and
European."
DNAPrint
Home
Page,
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/productsandservices/forensics/
(last visited
Apr. 11, 2007). The company advertises that "We have performed about
13,000 'blind' tests to date. For example, one west coast police department
sent 16 samples collected from members of the department. The results were
judged by them to be correct (consistent with phenotype and self-held notions
of ancestry) for all 16 samples." Id.
42. See generally Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 39.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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probable cause is required is not always apparent.
The questions here include the following: (1) May police go
door-to-door, or car-to-car, canvassing for "voluntary" DNA
samples but threatening individuals with becoming targets for
further investigation if they refuse to cooperate? (2) May the
state obtain tissue samples from medical providers without the
knowledge or consent of the donor? 44 (3) If DNA is extracted
without any bodily intrusion (for example, by following a
suspect and collecting shed hairs or saliva from a beer mug at a
bar), is there a search that must be justified under the Fourth
Amendment? (4) May police trick a suspect into providing
DNA, for example, by mailing the suspect a letter on law firm
stationery saying he is eligible for money in a class-action
lawsuit and then recovering saliva from the envelope
45
containing the claim form?
Most of these practices have been undertaken, and lower
courts have approved of some of them. 46 Certainly, some
deception in interrogations 47 and the warrantless collection of
"abandoned" possessions 48 are accepted with regard to
acquiring other types of information in criminal investigations.
To reach a different conclusion here would be to indulge in
"genetics exceptionalism," and that is precisely what some legal
49
commentators have proposed.

44. There are reports that this was done in Wichita to see if Dennis Rader
might be the notorious BTK killer. See Readers Still Want Answers on BTK,
WICHITA EAGLE, July 3, 2005 (reporting that
In an effort to hide from Rader that they were zeroing in on him as a
BTK suspect, investigators obtained a subpoena for his daughter's
DNA from a tissue sample stored at a medical clinic in Kansas. It
was processed within a week before Rader's arrest on Feb. 25. After
Rader was arrested, authorities took a DNA sample from his
daughter at her Michigan home to help confirm earlier test results.).

45. See Tracy Johnson, Convicted Murderer Says Officers Broke Law with
DNA Trick Police Ruse Case Argued, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REP.,
Jan. 27, 2006, at BI.
46. E.g., State v. Buckman, 613 N.W.2d 463 (Neb. 2000) (defendant
abandoned cigarette butt with saliva in police station).
47. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) ("Miranda
warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to
a[n undercover] law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement").
48. See John P. Ludington, Search and Seizure: What Constitutes
Abandonment of Personal Property Within Rule That Search and Seizure of
Abandoned Property Is Not Unreasonable Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381
(1985).
49. Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming 'Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth
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C. DNA DATABASES
In addition to the traditional use of trace evidence to show
the presence of a known suspect at a crime scene, all American
states, the federal government, and many other countries have
compelled convicted offenders to provide DNA samples for the
creation of computer-searchable databases of their identifying
profiles. These are used when there is no known suspect to
test. There are over four million records in the FBI's National
Database Index System (NDIS). The DNA records consist of
the STRs at thirteen loci selected by the FBI for common use.
The numbers are similar to passport or Social Security
numbers in that they are essentially arbitrary strings of digits
50
assigned by nature.
These databases help police to solve cases that have baffled
them for decades and to catch previously convicted offenders
who commit new crimes. In Virginia, there was the rapist who
blew out a candle before attacking his victim. The candle had
his saliva on it. There was the burglar who wore a pair of socks
on his hands and left no fingerprints. But he left the socks that
contained skin cells. There was the bank robber who dropped
his ski mask. All were identified by checking the DNA profiles
51
against the state's database of convicted felons.
At the outset, privacy advocates maintained that sexoffender databases were just the camel's nose and the
government would follow up with greatly expanded databases.
5 2
They were correct. The trend is toward all-felons databases.

Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006) (concluding
that courts are unlikely to extend Fourth Amendment protection to "covert
involuntary DNA sampling" but advocating a statutory requirement for a
warrant).
50. Professor Joh asserts that "some markers now thought to be
meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain predictive medical
information as the science progresses." Id. at 870. The basis for this claim is
flimsy. None of the NDIS markers are known to be predictive or diagnostic of
any medical condition. The news stories on which Professor Joh relies do not
suggest otherwise. D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006).
51. Profile: Use of a DNA Data Bank to Catch Criminals in Virginia,
(Nat'l Public Radio Morning Edition, Mar. 8, 2001), available at 2001 WL
9326731.
52. See, e.g., Amy Norton, DNA Databases: The New Dragnet, 19 THE
SCIENTIST 50 (2005); Rick Weiss, Vast DNA Bank Pits Policing vs. Privacy:
Data Stored on 3 Million Americans, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at Al ("At
least 38 states now have laws to collect DNA from people found guilty of
misdemeanors, in some cases for such crimes as shoplifting and fortunetelling.
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Furthermore, the individuals who might be implicated by
DNA database searches are not necessarily limited to those
whose samples are in the database.5 3 When a Winston-Salem
newspaper editor was raped and killed in 2003, the DNA trace
did not fully match anything in the database, but one convicted
offender was a near match. This similarity suggested that
although the criminal whose DNA was on file was not the
murderer, a sibling might be. Sure enough, detectives found
that there was a brother. By following the brother, detectives
were able to collect DNA evidence from saliva he left on
discarded cigarette butts. His DNA proved to be a perfect
match to the sample from the crime scene. 54 Does such "nearmatch searching" infringe any rights or exceed statutory
55
authority, or is it simply a clever investigative practice?
Concerns also have been voiced with regard to the uses to
which the DNA data and samples might be put. 56 Some
bioethicists and law professors have claimed that the laws
countenance research with offender records or samples in
violation of the Nuremburg Code and the basic principle of
medical ethics and human rights that forbids medical
experimentation on human subjects.57
The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) fears that the government will use the

At least 28 now collect from juvenile offenders, too."). The experience with
expanded databases has greatly undermined the prediction of the first
National Academy committee that "itis clear that crimes of most types will
not afford the opportunity to recover relevant biological evidence that will
allow the police to identify an unknown suspect-i.e., the perpetrator's own
body fluids. They include larcenies, burglaries, and assaults .. " COMMITTEE
ON

DNA

TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE,

supra note 25, at 120.

53.

See, e.g., Frederick R. Bieber et al., Human Genetics: Finding
Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 SCIENCE 1315 (2006); David

R. Paoletti et al., Assessing the Implications for Close Relatives in the Event of
Similar But Nonmatching DNA Profiles, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 161 (2006).
54. Richard Willing, Suspects Get Snared by a Relative's DNA, USA
TODAY, June 8, 2005, at Al. This proof of the brother's guilt triggered the
release from prison of Darryl Hunt, who had been imprisoned for the past
eighteen years. Id.
55. The most thoughtful analysis of this question published to date is

Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders'Kin, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 248 (2006).
56. See D.H. Kaye, Bioethics, Bench, and Bar: Selected Arguments in
Landry v. Attorney General, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2000).
57. Brief for Institute for Science, Law and Technology and Illinois
Institute of Technology as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, Landry v.
Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999) (No. SJC-07899).
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samples in a search "for a crime gene ...."58
In my opinion, claims like these are grossly overstated.
The kinds of research that are allowed are far less threatening
than pawing through millions of personally identified samples
for a mythical "crime gene." The federal DNA Identification
Act of 1994 limits research to "identification research and
protocol development purposes," and then only "if personally
identifiable information is removed.' 5 9 The states must adhere
to the same privacy protections if they are to receive federal
60
funding for their forensic DNA laboratories.
Criminal DNA databases also prompt Fourth Amendment
concerns.6 1 Several states have adopted laws to take DNA from
people when they are merely brought into custody. With
almost no publicity, President Bush signed comparable federal
legislation into law. 62 Almost without exception, courts have
held that convicted offenders can be compelled to contribute
their DNA without probable cause (or any sort of individualized

58. Interview by Ira Flatow with Nadine Strossen, on National Public
Radio
Talk
of
the
Nation,
(May
25,
2001),
available at
http://www.sciencefriday.com/pages/2001/May/hourl_052501.html;
see also
Speeding DNA Evidence Processing:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Barry
Steinhardt, Associate Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington,
D.C.) (describing DNA samples as harboring our "most intimate secrets,"
possibly including "genetic markers for aggression, substance addiction,
criminal tendencies and sexual orientation"), availableat 2000 WL 342540.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (2000).
60. For a more thorough analysis of the DNA database statutes, see D.H.
Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS.259 (2006).
61. Much of my discussion of this issue is contained in D. H. Kaye, Who
Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other
Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188 (2006), which
pursues the matter in greater depth.
62. Section 1004(a)(1)(A) of the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 amended the
DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132, by providing that "[t]he
Attorney General may, as prescribed by the Attorney General in regulation,
collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested or from non-United
States persons who are detained under the authority of the United States." As
codified, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) provides that
[t]he Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish an
index of-(1) DNA identification records of-(A) persons convicted of
crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in an indictment or
information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples
are collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that DNA
samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination
purposes shall not be included in the National DNA Index System.
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suspicion) and without a warrant. 63 They have done so on two
theories. The first theory looks to Supreme Court cases that
dispense with the warrant requirement "when 'special needs
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause

requirement impracticable. '"'64

Certain

programs of compulsory drug testing of federal employees, for
example, have been upheld as reasonable because they serve
the government's special interest as an employer in reducing
the use of drugs in its work force or in safeguarding the public
65
with whom these employees deal.

However, the Supreme Court has cut back on this
exception by blocking its extension to programs whose "primary
purpose" is the enforcement of criminal law. For example, in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,66 the Medical University of
South Carolina began testing urine samples from pregnant
patients for drugs to build criminal cases that would induce
them to accept substance-abuse treatment. Because "the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence
for law enforcement purposes," 67 the Supreme Court held that
the testing program could not be sustained under the specialneeds doctrine.
The logic of the primary-purpose limitation is not entirely
clear. It seems odd to maintain that the balance of interests
permits dispensing with warrants or individualized suspicion
when non-law enforcement interests alone are pursued, but not
when both law enforcement and non-law enforcement interests
reinforce each other. Be that as it may, the convicted-offender
databases exist primarily to facilitate the identification of the
perpetrators of sexual assaults, murders, and many other
crimes. They have some secondary uses, such as identifying
missing persons or disaster victims, but criminal investigation
is their raison d'etre.

63. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Validity, Construction, and Operation of
State DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R.5th 239 (2000); Richard P. Shafer,
Validity, Construction, and Application of DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14135 et seq. and 10 U.S.C.A. § 1565, 187 A.L.R.
Fed. 373 (2003).
64. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
65. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
66. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
67. Id. at 83.
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Thus, the special-needs doctrine (as articulated in
Ferguson) is a poor fit to DNA databases.
Many courts
therefore have taken a different tack. Without explaining why,
they either have abandoned the notion that there needs to be a
categorical exception to the warrant requirement, or they have
a created a sui generis exception for DNA databases. These
courts maintain that the DNA data are extremely useful in
preventing and investigating crime, while the bodily intrusion
is minimal, the personal information only reveals individual
identity, and the individuals' status as a convicted criminal
diminishes his privacy. In this way, they have upheld taking
68
DNA after conviction.
Despite its popularity with the courts, a DNA-convictedoffender-only exception to the warrant requirement is
unsatisfactory. Reasoning that a conviction works a perpetual
forfeiture of Fourth Amendment protection is disturbing. I
understand, of course, that convicts have a reduced expectation
of privacy while they are incarcerated, but why is there a more
permanent loss of privacy? Would we say that a man or woman
who was once convicted of a crime but has long since completed
the sentence has no claim to the protections of the Fourth
Amendment? That the police are free to enter his home at
their whim?
I propose dealing with the problem, not by diminishing the
rights of convicted offenders, but by recognizing a new, well
cabined "biometric identification exception" to the warrant
requirement. Certain dicta suggest that the Supreme Court
might uphold compulsory acquisition of biometric data from a
person when (1) the process is not physically or mentally
invasive, (2) the data are useful primarily to link individuals to
crime scenes or to establish the true identity of a given
individual, and (3) the data are valid, reliable, and effective for
this purpose. 69 In these circumstances, harms to individuals
and the benefits of judicial review are minor; hence, the
balance between individual privacy and government interests
points to the reasonableness of the collection and use of the
identifying data without a judicial warrant. Practices such as
taking fingerprints, mug-shots, and DNA even at the time of an
arrest could be sustained under this exception.
The biometric exception also has the virtue of opening up

68.
69.

Kaye, supra note 61, at 192.
See id. at 193.
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public debate on the advisability of a population-wide database.
If we wanted to start to build such a database, we could start
now, as an addition to newborn screening programs. The police
would not need to collect or store the samples. The resulting,
comprehensive database-the records of the essentially random
digits in each person's DNA-would have a variety of
advantages. 70 For example, the inclusive database could not be
seen as disproportionately burdensome on minorities, who, for
a variety of reasons, tend to be swept into the criminal justice
system. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, about
one in three black males, one in six Hispanic males, and one in
71
seventeen white males will go to prison during their lifetime.
If criminal databases mirror these disparities, they will add to
the corrosive perception that the criminal justice system is
stacked against African-Americans and other minorities.
In the end, perhaps a population-wide database is not
desirable.
I am not prepared to urge its implementation
tomorrow. But its time may come. Then the challenge will be
to construct it so as to enhance public order and security while
respecting legitimate individual privacy rights. The double
helix is not only an icon of the "molecule of life." It also is a
metaphor for the intertwining of genetics and the law.
CONCLUSION
The science of human DNA identification has matured
greatly since its exuberant introduction in the late 1980s. After
years of bitter debates about laboratory techniques, statistics,
and population genetics, the admissibility of properly
conducted DNA tests of highly variable loci is no longer in
question. Along with this successful courtroom implementation
of DNA identification technology have come increasingly
aggressive uses of DNA in investigating crimes.
These
developments have attracted the attention of bioethicists and
civil-liberties advocates. In evaluating the expansion of DNA
databases for law enforcement and other uses of the forensic
science, however, it cannot be assumed that all the norms that
70. See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L.
REV. 413 (2003).
71. Thomas P. Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prevalence of
Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/piuspOl.htm.

(2003),

available at
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are accepted and valuable in the context for biomedical
research with human subjects necessarily are appropriate in
the context of forensic investigation with human suspects.
Establishing reasonable limits on the technological imperative
requires an appreciation and understanding of the law of
criminal procedure, the costs and benefits of the techniques,
and the political and ethical principles that foster a free society
of autonomous individuals. This brief review of history and
current issues does not answer the question of how far the
technology of DNA identification should be carried, but it does
reveal that the question cannot be ignored.

